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COMMENT 
FILL THE BENCH AND EMPTY THE DOCKET: FILIBUSTER 
REFORM FOR DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS 
Jeremy Garson* 
Judges are, without question, vital to our justice system. They 
interpret, adapt, and apply the law. They resolve disputes for the 
parties to the case at issue and provide guidance to others in 
analogous situations. They are the gears that keep the wheels of 
justice moving. Unfortunately, in the case of our federal courts, 
many of these gears are missing. Eighty-three of our 874 federal 
judgeships are vacant,1 including thirty-four that have been 
declared “judicial emergencies.”2 
Our Constitution vests the President with the power to 
nominate federal judges and the Senate with the power to confirm 
or reject them,3 and Senate rules give the Judiciary Committee the 
power to hold hearings on each judicial nominee.4 Additionally, 
every individual senator has the ability to extend debate 
indefinitely (also known as the filibuster).5 As anybody who 
follows politics knows, this can lead to contentious debates and 
lengthy confirmation processes that keep getting lengthier.6 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, University of Michigan Law School. 
1. Federal Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/Fe
deralJudgeships.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2012); Judicial Vacancies, U.S. COURTS, http://ww  
w.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).
2.  Judicial Emergencies, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/
JudicialVacancies/JudicialEmergencies.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2012). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. 157 CONG. REC. S837 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2011) (“Meetings of the Committee may be
called by the Chairman as he may deem necessary.…”), available at http://www.judiciary.se 
nate.gov/about/committee-rules.cfm. 
5. Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/co
mmon/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
6. As of the beginning of September, the average wait time until confirmation for
district court nominees during the Obama administration is ninety days, up from twenty-
one days during the Bush administration, and eight days by the end of the Clinton 
J 
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Using the filibuster on judicial nominees, however, is only a 
recent development. In fact, it was not until 1968 that either party 
used the filibuster to block a judicial nominee (the victim was 
Abraham Fortas), and it was not used to block lower court 
nominees until Reagan’s presidency. Just because the trend is 
recent, though, does not make it arbitrary. With regard to the 
Supreme Court, there are only nine Justices, and they have the 
final word on what the Constitution means. Therefore, the 
credentials of each candidate should be reviewed carefully and if 
there is reason to believe that they may not be qualified, there 
should be mechanisms in place to prevent a swift confirmation. It 
also makes sense with circuit court judges since their word is final 
unless the Supreme Court agrees to hear the case—an extremely 
rare occurrence.7 With district court judges, however, there should 
be less of a reluctance to confirm. 
Federal district courts are (almost) always the first place 
federal litigants go when seeking justice. As a result, they play a 
vital role in the development of the common law and 
jurisprudence nationwide. At the same time, however, federal 
litigants have the right to appeal district court judgments to the 
appropriate circuit court unless they have expressly waived that 
right. 8 In other words, while providing a great service to those 
seeking justice, district court judges rarely, if ever, have the last 
word in high-stakes, controversial constitutional matters. 
Therefore, judicial vacancies at the district court level should be a 
rare occurrence. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Instead, nearly 
one in every ten district court judgeships is vacant.9 Indeed, of the 
thirty-four current “judicial emergencies,” twenty-eight of them 
are at the district court level.10 
To alleviate this problem, help reduce the backlog that 
currently plagues our judicial dockets, and provide improved 
administration. Steven M. Klepper, Confirming Consensus Nominees Quickly, THE FED. 
LAWYER 44 (Sept. 2012). 
7. David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme
Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of 
the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 250 (2009) (noting that less than 1 
percent of cases appealed to the Supreme Court are granted certiorari). 
8. See 9B FED. PROC., L. ED. § 22:2083 (setting forth the rules regarding a waiver of the
right to appeal). 
9. See Federal Judgeships, supra note 1; Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1.
10. Judicial Emergencies, supra note 2.
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justice for those who seek it, I propose to eliminate the ability to 
filibuster district court nominees. The argument against filibuster 
reform has always been the same: it protects the minority from 
the tyranny of the majority. While the Constitution makes no 
mention of the filibuster, it is the law of the Senate under Senate 
Rule 22,11 and has become an accepted tool for the minority to 
stop the majority from unilaterally pushing through legislation, 
Executive Branch appointments, and judicial nominations. 
This makes sense for legislation and Executive Branch 
nominees (enacted legislation is rarely repealed and it is difficult 
to overturn decisions made by executive officials).12 It also makes 
sense for some judicial nominations (circuit court and Supreme 
Court justices). As mentioned above, however, federal litigants 
have the right to appeal from district court rulings, and while the 
district court’s ruling carries weight on appeal, circuit court judges 
are certainly not obligated to defer to the district judge’s 
conclusions of law. Therefore, the advantages that filibuster 
protection offers to the minority, at least in the case of district 
judges, are outweighed by the advantages that would come with 
its elimination. The stakes are relatively low, and a filibuster-free 
process would still require the approval of a majority of senators. 
Logistically speaking, this proposal would be easy to adopt. 
The Senate is vested with the unilateral power to “determine the 
Rules of its Proceedings” under Article I, Section 5 of the 
Constitution.13 Neither the President nor the House of 
Representatives has a say in the matter, and the Supreme Court 
has affirmed this power.14 Therefore, if a sufficient number of 
senators were on board, a rule could be passed to make this the 
“law” of the Senate.15 
11. Cloture, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Clot
ure_vrd.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2012); Filibuster and Cloture, supra note 5. 
12. See, e.g., Wash. State Nurses Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 526 F.3d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2008)
(overturning a ban on wearing union buttons four years after the ban was put into 
place); cf. John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings 
of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 337 (2010) (“[T]he courts have 
overturned only two executive orders since 1789.”). 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
14. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4 (1892) (affirming that Congress may
determine its own rules). 
15. See generally Cogswell v. United States, 353 Fed.App’x. 175 (10th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting the argument that the failing to quickly confirm judicial nominees is a denial of 
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Of course, filibuster reform is much more difficult in the 
world of practical politics. As Chief Justice John Roberts 
previously stated, “[e]ach political party has found it easy to turn 
on a dime from decrying to defending the blocking of judicial 
nominations, depending on their changing political 
fortunes.”16 Chief Justice Roberts is correct in that the senators 
whose party does not control the White House do not want to give 
more power to the President.  On the other hand, there is 
precedent for the majority party pushing through a change to 
Senate Rule 22 in order to facilitate action.17 
My proposal, of course, is a much more narrow change to the 
rule. Regardless of the wisdom of requiring sixty senators to end a 
filibuster, there simply is not sufficient political momentum for 
such a significant reform.18 Instead, my proposal seeks only to 
promote judicial efficiency in an area where the possible negative 
consequences of such efficiency, as illustrated above, are simply 
not that great. Therefore, I believe a bipartisan approach would 
not only be ideal, but also would be very possible—even in our 
government as it exists today. Naysayers may say that this is 
wishful thinking in today’s highly charged political atmosphere, 
but this may not be true. After all, as recently as 2011, Democrats 
and Republicans had an agreement in place, “[to] only block 
judicial nominees in extraordinary circumstances”19 and that this 
agreement included both district and circuit court nominees. So 
the political will needed to pass this narrow, common sense 
reform may not be as great as it might seem on first blush. 
access to the courts); but cf. Karl A. Schweitzer, Comment, Litigating the Appointments 
Clause: The Most Effective Solution for Senate Obstruction of the Judicial Confirmation 
Process, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 909 (2010) (arguing that litigation is the most effective means 
of eliminating the judicial filibuster); Judicial Watch, Inc., v. United States Senate, 432 F.3d 
359 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (hearing arguments that the filibuster is unconstitutional as applied to 
judicial nominees). 
16. Robert Barnes, Justice Roberts Urges End to Partisan Fights Blocking Action on
Federal Judges, WASH. POST(Dec. 31, 2010, 6:01 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/31/AR2010123103188.html. 
17. See Walter F. Mondale, Resolved: Fix the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/opinion/02mondale.html. 
18. Cf. Putting Their Knives Away: The Senate Shies Away from Big Reform, THE
ECONOMIST (Feb. 3, 2001),available at http://www.economist.com/node/18070585 (discussing 
the failed movement toward filibuster reform). 
19. See Humberto Sanchez, Filibuster Tests Senate Agreement on Judicial 
Nominees, ROLL CALL (Dec. 7, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_70/filibust 
er_tests_senate_agreement-210833–1.html. 
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Of course, the public would need to be educated about the 
merits of the proposal before the Senate attempted to pass this 
rule change. Otherwise, there is a very good chance that the 
debate would be overwhelmed by partisan politics. Still, if the 
parties agree that the process needs to be smoother, maybe they 
can also achieve the cooperation needed to avoid a rebellion 
within their own parties. 
